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We develop a simple model in which fragmentation, innovation and imitation take in place
simultaneously. Firms in North fragment their business into two parts: assembly and services.
A reduction in the cost of services to coordinate fragmented businesses between North and
South does not enhance fragmentation. On the contrary, the arrival rate of imitation
accelerates and that of innovation slows down. Consequently, the life of Northern goods
becomes shorter and that of Southern copies becomes longer. We also derive other results to
compare to those in Grossman and Helpman (1991) and in Glass and Saggi (2001).
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Globalization is the most important keyword in considering world trade 
in recent years. It entails a wide range of issues in both theory and practice 
such as increasing wage differentials, unemployment resulting from 
outsourcing jobs abroad, and so forth. Globalization in theory is also called 
fragmentation, outsourcing or (economic) geography, etc1. We are especially 
interested in such a situation that a production process is fragmented, which 
incurs additional costs to coordinate internationally fragmented processes as 
pointed out in Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), so we use the term 
fragmentation to describe the phenomenon. 
Some authors have tackled the problem of fragmentation and growth. 
Above all, Glass and Saggi (2001) [GS, hereafter] and Grossman and 
Helpman (1991) [GH] are closely related to our analysis. GS analyzes 
fragmentation and innovation but imitation is absent. GH extensively 
analyzes a product cycle model although fragmentation is absent. Glass 
(2004) extends GS to incorporate costless imitation that is exogenously given. 
None of these analyses considers coordination costs so we barely know how 
fragmentation and a product cycle affect each other. Therefore, our task is to 
shed light on this issue by constructing a framework of fragmentation in a 
model of endogenous product cycles. 
The three propositions below summarize our results and we compare 
them to the pioneers’ above. We begin with the illustration of our model. 
 
 
2.  Basic Model 
 
There are two countries, North and South, in the world. Each has labor as 
the only resource in this model. A type of R&D is innovation in North and 
imitation in South. The former aims to improve the quality of a product and 
the latter aims to learn how to copy the quality improved.   
 
2.1  Consumers 
 
We use the quality ladders model of GH. Consumers choose a product 
with the lowest quality-adjusted price in each industry. There are   goods 
Northern firms supply and   goods Southern firms supply. There is only 
one good with the lowest quality-adjusted price in each industry and we 
normalize the industry measure such as  . The world expenditure 
is also normalized to be one at each point in time so that the interest rate is 






                                            
1  See Krugman (1995) on geography. See Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) on various 
issues of fragmentation. 
  1demand for each good   is equal to 1/  for  . (The details are 















2.2  Firms 
 
A Northern firm has the exclusive right to sell the state-of-the-art good 
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Any Northern firm fragments its business into two parts, assembly and 
services, and outsources the former to South and engages in the latter by 
itself. The unit labor requirement of assembly is a  in units of Southern 
labor. Services that coordinate the fragmented businesses between North 
and South cost   in units of Northern labor as fixed costs. We assume any 
innovative project targets copies so that a successful innovator charges 
, where   is the quality difference between the new good and 
the old copy whose marginal cost is one in units of Southern labor
F c
N p λ = 1 λ >
2. By limit 
pricing, Northern firms always win the price competition until an imitation 
succeeds.  
We also assume that any imitative project in South targets a 
state-of-the-art good. A successful imitator earns 
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By limit pricing, it sets   to win the competition. For both types of 
firms to coexist,    is required. Fragmentation transfers technology 
from North to South. The production of state-of-the-art goods entails some 
information or knowledge South has not mastered. Therefore, a  
implies that the productivity rises once South masters the required 
technology. On the other hand, λ  implies that innovation should be 
sufficiently profitable.   
SS
F pw a =





2.3  Free Entry and No Arbitrage 
 
A unit of R&D activities requires one unit of labor per unit of time in each 
country. If innovators undertakes R&D targeting one good at intensity ι , 
the probability of success is equal to  . As for an imitator, the counterpart is  ι
 
2  This corresponds to the case of inefficient followers in GH. Many cases are possible, 
for example, a Northern innovator also targets a Northern good, and so on. We confine 




Free entry into R&D races implies that the expected reward for successful 
R&D    must be equal to the R&D cost in each region
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No arbitrage remains, π , where the risk is   for 
South and is µ  for North. The steady state we investigate requires 
. Using (1), (2) and (3), we have a reduced form of no-arbitrage 
conditions as follows: 
//
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2.4  Labor Market 
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Southern labor engages in R&D and the assembly of both imitative and 
innovative goods: 
  . (7)  //
NS S N S
FF nn w an aw µ λ ++
 
 
3.  Steady State 
 
We investigate a steady state where the resource allocation is constant: 
the reward for R&D success, R&D intensity, the fraction of each type of firms 
and the wage in both regions should be constant. We add the following 
conditions: 
  , (8)  1
NS nn +=
  . (9) 
S gn n ι µ ≡ =
 
The latter requires that the inflow should meet the outflow of each type of 
goods. Therefore,   denotes the rate of innovation and imitation and they 
are equalized in the steady state
g
4. 
It  immediately  follows  from (6) and (9) that 
 
3  At intensity µ, for example, an imitator succeeds with probability µ for a time interval 
dt. Then, max (v
S-w
S) µdt leads to  (3). 
4  This is inherent in the quality ladders model. 
  3  , (10) 
N
F gLc n = −
N
 
where   and g   w. r. t.  . We also manipulate (5), (7), (8) and (9) 
to get 
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where   w. r. t. n  can be positive or negative (Appendix B). In Fig. 1, we 
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Then, we have a unique steady state since    is positive in (10) and is zero in 





5. Note an 
angle of the triangle that contains the origin and steady state point 
represents   or µ (see (9)). 
 
 
4.  Comparative Steady States and Policy Implications 
4.1  An Expansion of Resources 
 
An increase in   shifts NN upward and SS is unaffected. The steady 
state moves from point E to F along SS as illustrated in Fig. 2:   rises and 
  falls. As its labor increases, North allocates more to R&D, which leads to 
an increase in the Southern allocation to R&D. We thus have a higher rate of 
innovation and imitation. Since SS has a negative slope, an increase in   is 







As the steady state moves from point E to F, the lower-right angle gets 
flatter and the lower-left angle gets steeper (Fig. 1, 2). Therefore, an increase 
in   overwhelms an increase in g  so the arrival rate of innovation ι  
decreases. On the other hand, the arrival rate of imitation   increases due 
to a decrease in n . Since g  and   increase, the demand for labor 
increases in South. This raises    (see (5) with a smaller  ). In contrast, an 
increase in the Northern labor supply lowers its wage   (see (4) with a 
larger  ). Alternatively, an increase in L   moves the steady state 








We summarize these results in the following proposition, where we 
 
5  Otherwise, we would have no or two possible steady-state points. Then, in the latter 
case, we should consider which one is stable or relevant in practice, which might alter 
the results below. We leave this argument for interested readers. 
  4measure the extent of fragmentation by    since all Northern firms engage 
in fragmentation.   
N n
 
Proposition 1. An expansion of the Northern [Southern] labor force will 
i)  enhance the rate of innovation and imitation, 
ii)  raise [slow down] the arrival rate of imitation, 
iii)  slow down [raise] the arrival rate of innovation, 
iv)  discourage [encourage] fragmentation, 
v)  decrease [increase] the fraction of Northern products, 
vi)  increase [decrease] the fraction of Southern products, and 
vii)  reduce [raise] the relative wage of North. 
 
GH concludes an increase in the size of a region increases the fraction of 
products manufactured there in contrast to (v), (vi), and that the effects on 
the relative wage is ambiguous. On the other hand, GS concludes a decrease 
in Northern labor [an increase in Southern labor] will enhance [enhance] 
fragmentation, decrease [increase] the rate of innovation, and have no effect 
on the relative wage. Our results thus bridge the gap between these two 
models. 
 
4.2  A Reduction in Coordination Costs 
 
The recent decline in communication costs such as the ICT or IT 
revolution seems to help fragmentation by reducing coordination costs. We 
consider the effects of a reduction in the coordination cost. 
A reduction in the coordination cost rotates NN counterclockwise so that 
the steady state moves northwest along SS. The effects are straightforward 
other than one on the Northern wage. 
 
Proposition 2. A reduction in the coordination cost will 
i)  enhance the rate of innovation and imitation, 
ii)  raise the arrival rate of imitation, 
iii)  slow down the arrival rate of innovation, 
iv)  discourage fragmentation, 
v)  decrease the fraction of Northern products, 
vi)  increase the fraction of Southern products, and 
vii)  raise the wage of South and North. (see Appendix C) 
 
As the coordination cost declines, the expected reward for innovation 
rises. This attracts more resources to Northern R&D labs, ending up with a 
smaller extent of fragmentation (Appendix D explains in detail). The 
Southern government would like to subsidize to FDI from North by bearing a 
fraction of Northern fixed costs to increase job opportunities and to reduce 
imitation for a better relationship with North. On the contrary, the attempt 
will fail as shown in (i), (ii) and (iv). 
  54.3  R&D Subsidies 
 
Consider that a government in each country subsidizes R&D. This is the 
same as the effect of an improvement in R&D productivity6, which attracts 
more resources to R&D activities.   
A subsidy to Northern R&D rotates NN clockwise so that the steady state 
moves northwest along SS. On the other hand, a subsidy to Southern R&D 
moves the steady state southeast along NN since SS rotates clockwise.   
 
Proposition 3. A subsidy to innovative [imitative] R&D will 
i)  enhance [retard] the rate of innovation and imitation, 
ii)  slow down [raise] the arrival rate of innovation, 
iii)  raise [slow down] the arrival rate of imitation, 
iv)  discourage [encourage] fragmentation, 
v)  decrease [increase] the fraction of Northern products, 
vi)  increase [decrease] the fraction of Southern products, and 
vii)  raise [raise] the Southern [Northern] wage although the effect on the 
Northern [Southern] wage is ambiguous. 
 
An increase in the unit labor requirement of Southern imitation is 
regarded as tightening of the enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
Then, Proposition 3 states that it will promote the arrival rate of imitation 
and discourage fragmentation.   
GH concludes a small subsidy to innovative [imitative] R&D, evaluating 
at the initial state without subsidies, results in an increase [an increase] in 
the rate of innovation and imitation, a decrease [increase] in the fraction of 
Northern products, an increase [ambiguity] in the arrival rate of imitation, 
and an increase in the relative wage of North [South]. Alternatively, GS 
shows a subsidy to innovation enhances the rate of innovation, 
fragmentation, and increases the relative wage of North.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
We developed a model in which fragmentation, innovation and imitation 
take place simultaneously. North fragments its business into two parts, 
production and coordination. While South indirectly exports its cheaper labor, 
North indirectly exports its superior technologies. In sum, North loses its 
advantages in the global market through changes in favor of its resource 
constraint. 
A reduction in coordination costs or a subsidy to innovative R&D expands 
the Northern resource constraint. However, the fraction of Northern 
                                            
6  Note the productivity is normalized to be one in (3) for each country. Multiply the 
right-hand side (RHS) of (3) by the productivity aR
j. A reduction in the Northern 
increases the entire RHS of  (10)  while that in the Southern increases L
S in  (11). 
  6products, hence the extent of fragmentation, decreases as long as we have a 
steady state on the downward sloping part of SS. As we argue in Appendix D, 
the Southern wage increases and the extent of fragmentation decreases 
because the world demands more labor in South.   
The outcome that falling coordination costs or subsidies to innovation 
discourages fragmentation depends on the slope of SS. The price of copies 
depends on the Southern wage in our model with fragmentation although 
the price of originals depends on the Southern wage with or without 
fragmentation because Northern firms face Southern firms as their closest 
competitor. This is the crucial ingredient for SS to have a negative slope. In 
contrast, GH that excludes fragmentation has the Northern wage in their 
Southern labor constraint (15). 
We assumed the whole assembly takes place in South. If we allow for 
partial fragmentation as in GS and Glass (2004), a fraction of the assembly 
takes place in North so that the marginal cost of Northern goods, hence the 
price of copies, also depends on the Northern wage. This might alter the 
slope of SS so our results would reverse. 
GS shows a subsidy to innovation enhances outsourcing. Since they do 
not include imitation, South does not allocate more resources to R&D as 
North does. Consequently, the relative wage of North rises in their 
proposition 4. Incorporating imitation in South therefore makes South 
reallocate its resources between R&D and production although incorporating 
partial fragmentation with uncertain probability would change our results to 
such as GS. 
On the other hand, we ignore the possibility North also targets Northern 
goods as in GH, GS and Glass (2004). Allowing for this possibility opens the 
channel of the reallocation of resources between two types of R&D in North. 
Incorporating costless imitation as in Glass (2004) alters the analysis in this 
direction rather than considering the reallocation effect in South. 
Our focus is fragmentation that incurs coordination costs. If North takes 
advantage of lower costs in South, the price of copies inevitably depends on 
the Southern wage to a large extent. Then, falling coordination costs 
encourage innovation and imitation so that the demand for labor in South 
increases. This raises the Southern wage, which gets rid of the advantage of 
fragmentation and resources shift from production to R&D in South. 
Therefore, falling coordination costs discourages fragmentation. 
As GS argues, an expansion of Southern resources leads to a greater 
extent of fragmentation and decreases the relative wage of South. Our 
analysis suggests that the recent expansion of fragmentation may be caused 
mainly by an increase in the Southern labor supply rather than reduced 
coordination costs. 
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Appendix A. Consumers 
 
The intertemporal utility is given by 
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The instantaneous utility is given by 
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where   denotes consumption of quality level   in industry  , 
and  . By symmetry, the demand for each good is 
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where   denotes the world expenditure on consumption and   is the 
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By normalization, we obtain  .  r ρ =
 
Appendix B. Slope of SS 
 
Define   given in (11) by g . Then, ga and 
. By construction, in the range of  , 
g
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Suppose  , in other words,  , each quality improvement 
is not so large. Then, (B.1) implies () . Alternatively, 
suppose   or λ . Then, (B.1) implies  . 
In either case,    must be positive. Manipulate  (11)  to get 
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where  ,   and La  
. Note   and  . If () , or C ,   
and   result directly from (11). If λ , or C , SS can 
have a positive slope for a small   due  to  ,  . (B.2) gives  us 
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Evaluating at  ,   holds  if  0
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This is rather restrictive. As long as we confine ourselves to a unique steady 
state rather than multiple steady states, SS and NN meet in the range 
where SS is sloping downward (see Fig. 3). This requires (12) again. 
Therefore, the propositions in the main text do not alter. 
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It is sufficient to show  . From  (10)  we have  /
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where the inside of the square brackets exceeds one due to  . ▐  /0
N
F dn dc >
Since the wage increases in both countries, the effect on the relative wage 
is ambiguous.   
 
Appendix D. Effects of the Reduction in the Coordination Cost 
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For a given w  an increase in g  according to an expansion of the 
Northern resource constraint, which stems from a reduction in the 
coordination cost or an increase in the Northern labor, requires a reduction of 
resources devoted to the production in South so that   must decrease if 
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This implies, for a constant L ,   must decline as   grows. The total 
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Figure 1. Steady State at Point E 
 







Figure 2. An Increase in   
N L
 
NN shifts upward (not drawn) and SS is unaffected. The steady state 
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  11Figure 3. Shape of SS on condition that  (B.5)  holds. 
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